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EU SECURITY DISCOURSE: CREATøNG NEW REGIONAL 




The European Union (EU) as an international actor has slowly been 
incorporated into geopolitical reality, by academics and other international 
actors. This makes it all the more important to understand how the EU sees 
the world in which it interacts and what role security matters play in this 
construction. In this article we will analyse how the EU constructs regions. 
We will be looking at how the Mediterranean and the Gulf in particular are 
represented as regions by the EU. The EU relationship with the 
Mediterranean is quite developed, but as to the Gulf there is still much to do. 
This is slowly changing; recently the EU began considering a regional 
approach due to increasing security concerns. The current trend in 
discourse incorporates the Gulf countries into a wider Middle East, perhaps 
signalling the beginning of a coherent regional strategy for what could 
become another area of insecurity in EU eyes.
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 Introduction  
The European Union (EU) is increasingly seen as a capable actor in 
world affairs, not only in the sphere of economic relations but also on 
security issues. Its presence has slowly been incorporated into geopolitical 
reality, by academics and other international actors. Security wise, the EU 
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is set to take on greater responsibilities in the coming years: the creation of 
“Battlegroups”1 and the recent EU operation in the Congo are but two 
recent examples of this growing responsibility. This makes it all the more 
important to analyse and understand how the EU represents, and sees, the 
world in which it interacts. How does the EU deal with the world? What 
spatial divisions does it recognize in the world and why? Also, what role do 
security matters play in this construction? In this article we will be looking 
at the regional level: how the EU constructs regions. This constitutes, after 
all, the lens through which Europe sees and relates to the world. We will 
therefore be looking at boundaries, not in a traditional sense meaning those 
between two states and the associated disputes that borders usually bring, 
but instead, looking how the Mediterranean and in particular the Gulf are 
represented by the EU as regions.
The focus, then, is on the relationship between discourse and 
boundaries, specifically on how European Union security discourse 
conceives regional boundaries in the Arab world2, giving special attention 
to the Gulf as a region and its boundaries. In the first section of this article, 
we will look at Euro-Mediterranean relations that produced its own 
discourse, reflecting both concerns and aspirations for the region, but also 
renewing the Mediterranean as a region. The Euro-Mediterranean process is 
an important example of how the EU has previously affected regional 
boundaries through security discourse. The Gulf region is another area in 
which the EU is showing increased interest, developing its relationship with 
countries in the region. We will be looking at how EU discourse is shaping 
regional boundaries in that part of the Arab world.  
With an ever-evolving security discourse, how does European 
security discourse see the Gulf region and its boundaries? In particular, 
what boundaries is EU discourse favouring for the Gulf region? Could we 
see another regional grouping forming in the region to better address the 
EU’s security concerns or will the EU prefer a bilateral approach, 
negotiating with the different countries in the region? There is also the 
possibility of extending the Euro-Mediterranean framework to encompass 
1 European Union Council Secretariat, “EU Battlegroups”, Factsheet, Brussels, Council of the European Union, 
2005. [Available Online] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/BattlegroupsNov05factsheet.pdf 
2 For the European Union, the Arab world consists of:  Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Iraq, Yemen and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates). See: The 
Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union, “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the Arab 
World”, 15945/03, PESC 791. Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003. 
PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2006
EU Security Discourse: Creating New Regional Boundaries 
in the Mediterranean and Gulf Regions
3
Telmo J. Vieira
PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2006
the Gulf countries. To address the different regional security issues, new 
regional boundaries might be drawn up in order to support a more active 
European role, giving us some insight into EU plans regarding the region. 
For instance, perhaps a Barcelona style framework for the Gulf region or 
even the entire Arab world is being planned, or some other form of 
cooperation could be in the works.
The notion of boundaries is a complex one, yet a very present one: 
its importance in contemporary international affairs may perhaps be a 
paradox as we often hear about the disappearance of borders in a globalized 
planet. This paradox is further complicated when one takes a closer look at 
the term ‘boundary’ which reflects a limiting line, a limit of action.3 The 
demands of the contemporary world make it harder to impose limits of 
action; states, international organizations and even multinationals are 
capable of affecting societies well beyond their own borders or 
jurisdictions. In the words of Ó Tuathail, in recent years there have been: 
spatial transformations that have seriously eroded state 
sovereignty, blurred boundaries between the “inside” and 
“outside” of states, and produced a common “global 
society” facing dangers and threats that emanate from no 
single state but from the successes and excesses of 
advanced modernity.4
Hence, the way in which boundaries are defined changed, adapted to this 
new context, no longer lines on a map, but complex constructions that 
reflect more than physical or material elements. 
As such, boundaries are both a social construction and a political 
representation, localized in time and space within a specific context and the 
result of concrete practices (treaties for example).5 Within this new 
approach to boundaries and geopolitics, security discourse is to be a crucial 
element for the perception of boundaries and gives way to a set of concrete 
practices that reflect both boundaries and concerns. The French word for 
boundaries, “frontières” helps us understand this point. The French word 
3  C. T. Onions, ed. with the Assistance of G. W. S. Friedrichsen and R. W. Burchfield, The Oxford Dictionary of 
English Etymology, London, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 110. 
4 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “The Postmodern Geopolitical Conditions: States, Statecraft, and Security at the 
Millennium”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 90, No. 1 (2000), p. 167. 
5  Michel Foucher, L’Invention des Frontières, Paris, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, 1986, pp. 
55-56. 
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contains “front”, the front line, where the enemy passes, and it is associated 
with conflict and security.6 What or who the enemy is has also changed. 
The whole concept of security, and the way we speak about it has 
undergone a major transformation: it is no longer limited to the traditional 
military threats. These geopolitical discourses are increasingly flexible, 
going beyond a state centric view of “space and security, territory and 
threats”.7 How we perceive security has evolved, discourse serves to 
identify which issues are considered security threats or priorities, or at least 
presented in that way; it, discourse, mediates facts, to give “meaning that is 
then carried by actors in a particular situation”.8
 
Discourse is how we can discover these social constructions; 
discourse, or rather its rhetorical structures, allow studying and identifying 
how these constructions are established and what meaning is given to 
certain terms or concepts.9 In other words, boundaries are to be understood 
“not merely as static lines but as a set of practices and discourses which 
‘spread’ into the whole of society”.10 From a geopolitical point of view, 
discourse has been assimilated, being considered an essential element in the 
constructing and perceiving of the world: “The study of geopolitics in 
discursive terms, therefore, is the study of the socio-cultural resources and 
rules by which geographies of international politics get written”.11
Boundaries go beyond simple lines on a map they define; they are a 
representation of social practices and discourses. Discourse can tell us how 
we see the other, and who he is and even where he is, and this immediately 
creates boundaries. As a result, looking at the discourse we can determine 
the meaning of certain terms, like Gulf or Arab world for example, and 
identify what they represent in the public sphere, in other words their 
boundaries.
6  Ibid., p. 60. 
7 Ó Tuathail, “The Postmodern Geopolitical Conditions: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium”, p. 
167. 
8 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis. France, Britain and Europe, London, Routledge, 1997, 
p. 26.   
9 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998, pp. 176-177. See also Ole Waever, “Resisting the Temptation of Post Foreign Policy Analysis,” 
in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy. The EC and Changing Perspectives in 
Europe, London, Sage Publications, 1994, p. 254. 
10  Anssi Paasi, “Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish – Russian Border”, Regional Studies, 
33, No. 7 (1999), p. 670. 
11 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, “Geopolitics and Discourse. Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in 
American Foreign Policy”, Political Geography, 11, No. 2 (March 1992), p. 193. 
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As we have seen, the way we perceive security and boundaries has 
changed. The interaction between them within the contemporary context 
needs to be explored. In that respect regions are today an important reality 
in the international scene; the regional level has taken up an increasingly 
important role in international relations.12 There is a greater tendency to 
talk about the world with an emphasis on regions; we speak about the Arab 
world, the Mediterranean or the Gulf, about Latin America and the 
Mercosul and so forth. In this respect, the EU has been at the forefront, 
helping to put regions back on the agenda, both as a successful model and 
in engaging various regions and regional groupings throughout the world. 
As we will see, EU security perception helped to forge the boundaries of a 
Mediterranean region, bringing together various actors in order to solve the 
region’s security problems. These security perceptions are also at work in 
the Gulf region, bringing forth new boundaries and possibilities for EU 
foreign policy.
 The Creation of the Mediterranean  
 The Mediterranean is an important case study for anyone attempting 
to understand how boundaries and discourse interact. This region has 
received particular attention from the EU redefining the Mediterranean 
through discourse, notably security discourse. After the end of the Cold 
War new security threats emerged and, consequently, European discourse 
began to address these threats and the location from where the threats 
where originating. It can be said that while doing this, the EU began a 
process of construction or reconstruction of the Mediterranean, turning it 
into a geopolitical area of concern to Europe.13
 The EU perceives the Mediterranean as an area of insecurity from 
which threats emanated, posing a challenge to European security. This 
perceived insecurity was enough to create a Mediterranean region, 
encompassing various states that supposedly belong to a coherent region; 
security was enough of a criterion to bind them together. According to 
Michelle Pace, “the Mediterranean becomes more ‘real’ on the EU agenda 
12 See Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
13 Pinar Bilgin, “A Return to ‘Civilisational Geopolitics’ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of 
European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era”, Geopolitics, 9, No. 2 (2004), pp. 270, 273. See also 
Michelle Pace, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Mediterranean Strategy? European Union 
Policy from a Discursive Perspective”, Geopolitics, 9, No. 2 (2004), p. 265 and Martin Ortega, “Some Comments 
on the European Union’s Mediterranean Policy”,  Perceptions, VIII, June-August (2003).   
6 PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2006
EU Security Discourse: Creating New Regional Boundaries 
in the Mediterranean and Gulf Regions Telmo J. Vieira
PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2006
when issues are conceived as a threat to Europe’s security … Thus, what 
unifies the Mediterranean in European eyes and the issues that make 
discourse of the Mediterranean ‘effective’ … are security matters”.14
Security concerns form a substantial part of EU regional creation in the 
Mediterranean, creating an “other” characterized by elements of insecurity 
and by boundaries reflecting the discourse.
Before we deal with the boundaries of the Mediterranean, a few 
words on the security issues that shape the region. First, we must 
understand security in a broad sense; there are many issues that are 
addressed from a security viewpoint. Looking through, for example, the 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial conferences, certain issues are repeated 
throughout the meetings, issues that are considered a threat to peace and 
stability in the region: one can identify five security issues in the 
Mediterranean of concern to the EU: Immigration, Terrorism, Organized 
Crime, Regional Conflicts and Weapons of Mass Destruction. As we can 
see these issues encompass a wide range of areas; they affect both external 
and internal security, threatening economic, social and political stability 
within the Union. These issues are agreed upon by all participants in these 
meetings and are the object of measures in order to deal with them; 
although, as some have suggested there is an imbalance of power regarding 
the participants which can affect what issues are put on the table.15 Despite 
this, there is a desire to engage the region to address security concerns on 
the part of the EU. It is the perceived presence of these issues that brought 
the EU to its current initiatives, especially at the beginning of the 1990s, 
when various countries in the region were facing political and economical 
crises: 
high demographic growth rates, economic crises, and the 
incapability of several governments to initiate comprehensive 
political reforms are major causes for the fundamentalism and its 
violence in Algeria as well as in other countries. The breakdown of 
ideologies and failure of economic models due to corruption of 
14 Michelle Pace, “The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European 
Union”, Journal of European Area Studies, 10, No. 2 (2002), pp. 203-204.  
15 See Pace, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Mediterranean Strategy? European Union 
Policy from a Discursive Perspective”, pp. 293, 303. She argues that initially the Mediterranean dialogue was 
concluded only on the EU side and that the other participants did not have any input on what was initially to be 
discussed. See also the meeting of Cannes 1995 where the EU sets its priorities for then upcoming Barcelona 
Conference in: The Council of the European Union. Cannes European Council 26 and 27 June 1995. [Available 
online] http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm  
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government elites are typical causes of frictions in the 
Mediterranean.16
This context helped reshape the Mediterranean region, forcing the 
EU to rethink its approach and view of the Mediterranean region. Initially, 
Euro-Mediterranean relations were bilateral, happening only at the state 
level, led by a few European states. Several EU member states had a long 
history in the region, including a recent colonial history, so countries like 
France or Spain were at first more inclined to pursue bilateral cooperation, 
in particular with their former colonies. Despite this there where some 
initiatives by the then European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s 
and 1970s mostly in the economic area. During this time there used to be a 
separation between Western and Eastern Mediterranean, that is, between 
Maghreb and Mashreq. For example, accords were signed with countries 
forming the Maghreb in 1976 and with the countries of the Mashreq in 
1977. However, from the 80s all the way through the 1990s, a series of 
events brought the EEC and later the EU closer to the Mediterranean. With 
Greece, Spain and Portugal joining, the Mediterranean dimension gained 
new momentum; the EU now had now a continuous border with the 
Mediterranean. But beyond this, events in the region influenced EU 
perceptions, discourse and its approach to dealing with the different 
security challenges in the region. Mounting instability with the local 
regimes, including civil war in Algeria, the Gulf War but also the launching 
of the Middle East Peace Process all contributed to a changing discourse.17
Prior to the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, a common position 
had been agreed upon, putting forward Europe’s concerns regarding the 
region. The Cannes European Council meeting (June 1995) expressed 
Europe’s desire to tackle the perceived problems mentioned earlier, notably 
immigration, terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and regional conflicts. With the signing of the “Barcelona 
Declaration” we have the Mediterranean being tackled as one region, where 
the EU wishes for peace, stability and security.18
16 Jean-François Daguzan, “Confidence Building Measures, Disarmament and Crisis Prevention: A View from the 
North,” in Hans Günter Brauch, Antonio Marquina, Abdelwahab (eds.) with the language assistance of Peter H. 
Liotta, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century, Basingstoke-London, Macmillan, 2000, p. 95. 
17 Pace, “The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union”, p. 197. 
18 Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Barcelona Declaration. Barcelona, 1995 [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm See also Helle Malmvig, “Cooperation or 
Democratisation? The EU’s Conflicting Mediterranean Security Discourses”, Danish Institute for International 
Studies, DIIS Working Paper 2004/8 (2004) for additional information on the EU’s security discourse in the 
region. 
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This discourse led to an approach to deal with security threats from 
the Mediterranean, notably the “Barcelona Declaration”, which above all 
things engaged all Mediterranean partners in dialogue. Therefore, 
Mediterranean boundaries reflect the fact that there is a need to counter 
these security threats, but that this will be done through dialogue and 
cooperation. Looking at the “Barcelona Declaration”, we see that all 15 EU 
member states, plus an EU representative from the Council and 
Commission, along with 11 non-EU Mediterranean States and a 
representative of the Palestinian Authority, signed the declaration.19  It is of 
note that all EU member countries plus representatives from the EU itself 
signed this declaration. The absence of Libya but the presence of Israel and 
the Palestinian authority are also of importance.
Despite this, there remains one important question to be answered, a 
question that is not entirely addressed in the discourse or at least the 
discourse still is unclear as to the answer. The question is the following: is 
the EU part of the Mediterranean? The EU definition of the Mediterranean 
remains a flexible one. There is, as we will see later, the possibility of 
extending the Mediterranean all the way to the Gulf, but one of the 
questions that remains to be answered is that of the EU’s relationship with 
the Mediterranean. The EU gave a Mediterranean identity to a number of 
states, and by doing so defining, partially, the borders of the Mediterranean. 
But will the EU’s discourse ever fully include itself in the Mediterranean, 
making the Mediterranean boundary go through the EU, therefore acquiring 
a Mediterranean identity? For now, we can put forward that to the EU, there 
is a Mediterranean, and although its borders are not permanent but subject 
to changes, there is an identifiable region called the Mediterranean to the 
EU.
 
 EU and Security Discourse in the Gulf  
 
The EU’s relationship with the Gulf States can be dated back to the 
early 1970s. During that decade Europe had to deal with oil price shocks 
and later on with the Iranian revolution, all these events helped the 
European countries realize the need for an independent European policy. 
One example of this growing awareness is the “Venice Declaration” of 
1980 where the ancestor of the EU established its basic position on the 
19 Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian 
Authority. At the time Malta and Cyprus were not EU members.  
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Middle East, calling for the right to existence, exchange of the Territories 
and security for all States in the region.20 However, until recently as we 
will see, no call for setting up a comprehensive framework encompassing 
the Gulf was made, only the Mediterranean became the object of a regional 
initiative. The 1970s with war and unrest in the Middle East marked the 
beginning of an independent European policy, albeit it a modest start, with 
preferential trade agreements and some policy cooperation between 
member states.  
Currently one could say that in contrast to the Mediterranean, the 
Gulf region is not immediately regarded as an area of priority for the EU, 
but this is perhaps about to change as we will see in this section. EU 
discourse and notably security discourse has evolved slowly, at first 
bilateral but later recognizing the importance of the region, recently calling 
for the adoption of a regional framework. In addition, despite this bilateral 
nature of discourse, security concerns have been present and thus are not a 
new addition for the EU in regards to the region. The change is in the 
realization of the impact security issues from this region could have for the 
EU. Looking at official EU documents21, in addition to some research 
papers and opinion pieces, we hope to determine how the Gulf is 
represented by the EU as a region. Within what is traditionally recognized 
as the Gulf, the EU maintains relations with several local actors, notably 
cooperation agreements with the GCC, in addition to relations with Iraq, 
Yemen and Iran.  
The EU has had a long relationship with the GCC as an 
organization, having followed its evolution since the late 1980s.22 In 
regards to security discourse, there are certain issues that seem to 
preoccupy both actors. For example, the conflict in the Middle East, 
20 Dorothee Schmid, Shai Moses, Alfred Tovias and Stephen Calleya, “Mapping European and American 
Economic Initiatives Towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and their Effects on Honest Broker 
Perceptions”, EuroMeSCo under the auspices of Leonard David Institute for International Relations, Hebrew 
University (Jerusalem), October 2006. [Available Online] 
http://euromesco.com.pt/images/leonard%20davis_ifri_medac_eng_final%20ts_ak.pdf 
21  Official documents included: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - EU Joint Ministerial and Council meetings 
from 2000 to 2005, the EU papers “Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World” (The Secretariat 
General of the Council of the European Union, “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the Arab World”.) and 
the “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” (Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, 10246/04, COMMEM 
11 COMAG 9, Brussels, Council of the European Union, 2004). 
22  The GCC was founded in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates 
with the basic objectives of coordinating, integrating and inter-connecting members States in all fields. In the 
course of this article the individual policies of each member States will not be analyzed since our main interest is 
EU perceptions and construction of boundaries in the Gulf.   
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear standoff with Iran, 
the war in Iraq and finally terrorism.23
The case of the GCC is an interesting one; the first element of 
interest is its nature as a regional organization. Despite not having the same 
degree of integration that the EU has, the GCC constitutes a viable partner 
in the region, that most importantly has shown a desire to continue to 
evolve, taking example from the EU.24 Another element of interest is the 
important security dimension present as the raison d’être of the GCC, 
which has to deal with both external and internal threats to regional 
security. Within this context, the EU favours a two-part strategy: on one 
hand, continuing the dialogue with the GCC on various security issues as 
we have seen above, and on the other hand, pushing for further integration 
in the region, specifically for the GCC, as a means for long term security 
for the GCC members themselves. Regional economic integration was 
discussed during the 15th EU-GCC Ministerial Meeting of 2005, in it “The 
EU considers regional economic integration processes as important 
instruments for peace, stability and prosperity”.25 The GCC and its member 
states will remain important for any EU initiative in the Gulf, having 
already established some foundations they can continue to work for security 
in the entire region.
In Iran, European involvement has been constant in regards to the 
nuclear crisis currently taking place, pushing for dialogue and a comprise 
solution through diplomacy. The EU’s major security concern as to Iran is 
its possible nuclear weapons program, although questions of human rights 
and support for radical groups are also of concern, but these last two issues 
are strangely not included under the security heading of the 2001 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on EU-Iran relations, which is clearly dominated by Iran’s nuclear 
program.26 Strangely because these issues, human rights and especially 
23 See the GCC – EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meetings between 2000 and 2005, available at:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=398&lang=en&mode=g for the 15th EU-GCC Joint Council 
and Ministerial Meeting consult:   
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/finaldecl_050405.pdf 
24 An example of this is the push for a single currency. See, “Gulf States Push for a Single Currency”, BBC News, 
Business, 10th October 2002. [Available Online] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2313847.stm
25 15th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, Joint Communique, Manama, 5 April 2005, p. 2. 
[Available Online]  http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/finaldecl_050405.pdf   
26 Commission of the European Communities, “EU Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran”, COM (2001)71, 
Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 2001. [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/doc/com_2001_71en.pdf 
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support of radical groups, are traditionally approached by the EU from a 
security perspective. With reference to Iran, the EU has put forward a series 
of issues that guide the dialogue with Iran: 
– Global issues (terrorism, human rights and proliferation); 
– Regional issues (Iraq, Gulf, Central Asia, the Middle East Peace 
   Process); 
– Areas of cooperation (drugs, refugees, energy, trade and
   investment).27
Finally, regarding EU-Iran relations, it is of note that some experts 
meetings on drug trafficking and refugees have taken place, showing a 
broadening engagement with Iran. The EU approach to Iran has been to 
engage in dialogue and offer incentives, rather than excluding it from the 
international community or any settlement on the nuclear issue. The EU did 
not support immediate military options, trying to mediate between Iran and 
the more hawkish position of the United States.         
Iraq and Yemen are the two other actors that are engaged with the 
EU within cooperation agreements or, in the case of Iraq, assistance 
programs. Regarding Iraq, the EU and notably the Commission have 
supported reconstruction efforts in the country, while the invasion of Iraq 
caused a rift between member states. The reconstruction efforts are part of 
EU policy with three main objectives: 
x The development of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq;  
x The establishment of an open, stable, sustainable and 
diversified market economy; 
x Iraq’s political and economic integration into its region and 
the international system.28
Stability and security in Iraq are a concern for the EU, who commits funds 
not only for the reconstruction of infrastructures, but also supports the 
political reconstruction that is now being attempted. The EU is looking to 
intensify its relation with Iraq, preparing the framework for formalised 
27 Ibid. 
28 Commission of the European Communities, “The EU and Iraq: A Framework for Engagement”, COM (2004) 
417/1, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 2004. 
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contractual relations.29 Until now the EU’s involvement in Iraq has been 
relatively low key, although one of its members, the UK, has an important 
contingent of troops in the country. Despite this, the EU will continue its 
mainly political and economical engagement, as well as to work with all 
parties involved to achieve its main objective, which is security and 
stability in Iraq. 
In the case of Yemen, there are concerns over terrorism, according 
to the European Commission “Security remains a major problem for 
Yemen; the country is a target for terrorist attacks, but even more a 
potential safe haven for terrorist groups as logistical base for arms-
smuggling, training and recruiting of terrorists”.30 In addition to the 
economic aid received by Yemen, a political dialogue was initiated between 
the EU and Yemen in 2004. This dialogue focuses on democratisation and 
human rights, but also on terrorism and on proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the aim being the enhancement of regional security and 
stability.31
As we have just seen, there is no overarching policy regarding the 
Gulf that directs EU efforts; rather the discourse shows that several 
independent initiatives are in place and that dialogue has been mostly 
bilateral, with agreements with Yemen, Iran, and Iraq, but also with the 
GCC. Remarkably, such a complex region with important security issues, 
as for instance terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, is the object of a 
weak security discourse. The absence of energy security in the security 
discourse so far is of interest: it is perhaps unexpected when taking into 
account the energy reserves present in the different states in the Gulf.32
29 Commission of the European Communities, “The EU’s Relations with Iraq”, Commission of the European 
Communities external relations web page [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/index.htm 
30  Commission of the European Communities, “The EU’s Relations with Yemen”, Commission of the European 
Communities external relations web page [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/yemen/intro/index.htm 
31 Commission of the European Communities, “Draft Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue between the 
European Union and the Republic of Yemen”, Commission the European Communities [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/yemen/intro/joint_decl_06-07-04.pdf 
32 In the recent European Green Paper on Energy Security there is little mention of the Gulf, only two passing 
references to the region, in contrast with the growing attention being given to Russia. See Commission of the 
European Communities, “A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy”. COM(2006), 
Green Paper, Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 2006. [Available Online]   
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf 
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The dialogue initiated between the EU and the different states has 
not concentrated on security matters, and the dialogue that has existed has 
been of little substance, including the EU-GCC initiatives.33 Despite this, 
security has begun to take a greater role in the EU’s perception of the 
region, as was made evident by the 2003 EU communication on 
“Strengthening the EU's partnership with the Arab World”: 
The main objective of the EU in its relations with the Arab 
World is to promote prosperity, peace and stability, 
thereby not only contributing to the welfare and security of 
the region, but also to its own security. Problems of 
terrorism and WMD originating there have a direct impact 
in Europe. In this context, the solution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is essential. There will be little chance of dealing 
fully with other problems in the Middle East until this 
conflict is resolved; such a resolution is therefore a 
strategic priority for the EU.34
Other declarations seem to reinforce this idea of a greater EU 
interest in the region, due to security concerns, an interest that can lead to 
greater cooperation between the EU and the Gulf. In December 2005 then 
French Foreign Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, was quoted as saying:
Concerning security issues, the Arabian-Persian Gulf 
seems to many like the private domain of the United States 
… Europe could provide a very important contribution to 
the region because it is a heavyweight actor and because 
we, Europeans, consider that we are capable of bring in 
our experience and help in the stabilization of the Gulf.35
Perceptions and discourse about the Gulf have evolved enough for 
the EU to recognize the importance of this region. The dwindling 
credibility of US in the region, unable to stabilise it after its invasion of Iraq 
33 Christan Koch, “Making Education the Focus of Gulf-Europe Ties,” Khaleej Times, September 25, 2005, 
Opinion, [Available Online]   
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=opinion&xfile=data/opinion/2005/september/opini
on_september65.xml 
34  The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 7. 
35 Agence France Presse, “French Minister Calls for EU-Gulf Security Cooperation”, Agence France Presse, 
Decembre 3, 2005 [Available Online] http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-
2005/december-2005/french-minister-calls-for-eu-gulf-security 
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and to stop terrorist groups operating in the region, has in part contributed 
to this change in perception. Therefore, like earlier in the 1970s, today the 
EU has diverging policies from the US preferring a different independent 
approach based on cooperation, attempting to tackle the root causes of 
insecurity.36
Perhaps more than in any other region, security issues seem to 
permeate the Gulf at all levels, the EU seems to believe that any further 
developments in the Arab World are dependent on the resolution of these 
issues. In this respect, terrorism is an important issue for the EU, 
exemplified by the joint GCC-EU countries seminars on Combating 
Terrorist Financing, the second such meeting held in Abu Dhabi in March 
2005. The issue of terrorism is at the centre of EU security discourse 
throughout the region, but the broader question of regional security is also 
present in the dialogues between the EU and the different local actors, 
demonstrating that there are issues affecting all and not only some in the 
region. This idea of common regional security issues has been further 
solidified by the EU, following up its earlier communication regarding a 
partnership with the Arab world with its 2004 “EU Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and Middle East”, the latter putting forward a 
policy agenda which includes several issues considered essential to the EU 
and countries “East of Jordan”. Issues like: the Middle East Peace Process, 
Non-Proliferation, Security Dialogue and Counter Terrorism were 
included.37 Although there is a lack of any discourse on immigration, legal 
or illegal, to the EU from the Gulf, the EU recognizes that the security 
issues present in the region, notably of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction, do “have a direct impact in Europe”.38 Furthermore, if in the 
past the issue of oil supply, notably due to the oil crisis of 1973-1974, is in 
part responsible for the emergence of an independent EU policy for the 
region, in regards to the Gulf the issue of oil seems not to have been 
36 This divergence in approaches is also apparent due to the almost nonexistent mention of US backed 
frameworks for the region, notably the Greater Middle East Initiative, in official EU discourse. There seems to be 
little concern for US initiatives within European discourse, including if there is overlapping or not. For a more in-
depth look at the diverging policies in the Gulf between the US and the EU see Helle Malmvig, “An Unlikely 
Match or a Marriage in the Making? EU-GCC Relations in a Changing Security Environment”, Danish Institute 
for International Studies, DIIS Brief, November (2006). 
37 Additionally, the EU called countries “East of Jordan” to consider confidence building measures and to tackle 
the question of financing of terrorism. See: Presidency of the Council of the European Union, “EU Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, p. 10-12. 
38 The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 7. 
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securitized for now.39 Therefore, future EU discourse should promote 
peace, prosperity and stability in order to achieve EU objectives of security 
for the region and security for the EU as well. This likely new discursive 
orientation that moves towards a regional framework instead of a series of 
bilateral agreements would undoubtedly have an impact on the boundaries 
of the Gulf region in regards to the way the EU perceives them: 
In the process of progressively defining its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, it is time for the European 
Union (EU) to focus on the Gulf region. In the wake of the 
September 11 terrorist attacks and the regional realignment 
stimulated by the campaign against terrorism, an 
intensification of EU engagement in the Gulf region is 
imperative. A full-fledged Common Strategy toward the 
Gulf will have to include the EU’s position towards Iran, 
Iraq, Yemen and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC).40
 
 EU Security Discourse and Regional Boundaries in the Gulf 
 
We have seen how EU security discourse seems to be increasingly 
aware of the strategic importance of the Gulf. This has been reflected in 
recent EU strategy papers on the Mediterranean and Middle East and the 
Partnership with the Arab World, despite the fact that these documents 
contain no concrete proposals, only mentioning a need to develop a 
stronger link with the region “beyond Jordan”.41 This increasing strategic 
39 Dorothee Schmid, Shai Moses, Alfred Tovias and Stephen Calleya, “Mapping European and American 
Economic Initiatives Towards Israel and the Palestinian Authority and their Effects on Honest Broker 
Perceptions”, EuroMeSCo under the auspices of Leonard David Institute for International Relations, Hebrew 
University (Jerusalem), October 2006. [Available Online] 
http://euromesco.com.pt/images/leonard%20davis_ifri_medac_eng_final%20ts_ak.pdf 
The absence of oil and gas supply issues from the security discourse could be a conscious decision when dealing 
with the Gulf region, intended to avoid unsettling relations and compromising the EU’s energy security (an issue 
which would have arisen if the region’s energy reserves were introduced into a security discussion). 
Consequently, this seems to reflect, on the EU’s side, a perceived stability in oil and gas supplies coming from the 
Gulf to Europe. The same can be said about the Mediterranean where the issue of energy security seems not to 
have been securitized. 
40 Felix Neugart and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), “The EU and the GCC. A New Partnership”, in Bertelsmann Group 
for Policy Research, Center for Applied Policy Research in cooperation with The Mediterranean Programme, the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advance Studies, European Institute [Available online] 
http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2005/2005_GCC-EU.pdf  
41 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East” and Christian Koch and Felix Neugart, “Introduction”, in Christian Koch and Felix Neugart (eds.), 
A Window of Opportunity Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 
2005, p. 10. 
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importance is due to certain issues that seem to be present throughout the 
entire area and that the EU views from a security perspective, for example, 
the situation in the Middle East, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, the situation in Iran and Iraq and finally terrorism.42 In 
particular, within the EU-GCC framework, an important partner in the 
region, security issues have been gaining increasing importance. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a significant concern, but recent events 
in Iraq, Iran and the rise of terrorism have all been central to a growing 
security dimension within EU-GCC talks.  
For the moment, the Gulf region does not have a single unified 
meaning for the EU, but rather it makes reference to the GCC, Yemen, Iran 
and Iraq, each are being addressed individually, in a bilateral framework, 
and not as part of a Gulf policy. On the contrary, these countries plus de 
GCC are referred to as: “The countries of this part of the Middle East 
region”.43 All the actors are dealt with on an individual basis and not as part 
of a “Gulf region” with its specific dynamics and boundaries. However, 
with increasing calls for cooperation with the actors in the region, even if 
these calls still lack any specific measure; one expects them to lead to 
renewed region building efforts on the part of the EU in the Gulf.44 As
such, we can identify three possibilities for region building:
x The creation of a Gulf region distinct from the 
 Mediterranean or the Middle East; 
x  The creation of a Middle East region; 
x  Joining the Gulf and Mediterranean into one region.
 
42 See the GCC – EU Joint Council and Ministerial Meetings between 2000 and 2005, available at:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=398&lang=en&mode=g  for the 15th EU-GCC Joint Council 
and Ministerial Meeting consult:   
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gulf_cooperation/intro/finaldecl_050405.pdf 
43 Commission of the European Communities, “The EU’s Mediterranean & Middle East Policy”, Commission of 
the European Communities external relations web page [Available Online] 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/index.htm 
44 Javier Solana, “Intervention by Javier Solana EU High Representative for CFSP at the Forum for the Future 
Opening Session”, Rabat, Secretary General, High Representative for CFSP, December 2004. Javier Solana states 
neighbourhood of the Southern Mediterranean particularly with respect to the countries around the Gulf”. Also: 
“With the Mediterranean Partner countries, these objectives will be taken forward through a more effective 
implementation of the Barcelona Process goals, within Association Agreements and the development of the 
Wider Europe/New Neighbourhood Initiative. Reflection may be needed on the merits of developing a regional 
strategy in the future for the Gulf region, including Iran, Iraq, the GCC and Yemen.” In The Secretariat General 
of the Council of the European Union, “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the Arab World”, p. 8.   
:
 “It is no secret that the EU is also keen to strengthen its relationship with several countries beyond its immediate 
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The creation of a Middle East region or the gradual extension of the 
Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the 
Gulf are present in EU documents and in some research papers.45 On the 
European side, there are concerns about the overall stability of these 
regions: the security discourse identifies similar security issues from 
Morocco to Iran. In addition, both the EU and the different states of these 
regions see the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as a matter for concern. These are 
arguments in favour of the extension of the Neighbourhood Policy all the 
way to the Gulf. When we turn our attention to the Middle East, it is still 
unclear to the EU what this term encompasses; however in some of the 
discourse it does seem to include the Gulf.46 The Middle East is also 
referred to in another manner, as the “Wider Middle East” from December 
2003. Here the EU brings in the GCC, Yemen, Iraq and also including Iran 
to create a wider Middle East. The reasoning behind this is as follows: 
Recent developments point towards the need to establish a 
regional stability strategy for this group of countries 
which, with the addition of Iran, could be defined as the 
“Wider Middle East”. From a strictly political point of 
view, relations with the ACP belong to a different set of 
problems. There will then be two main lines of action for 
the EU in its relations with the Arab countries, the 
Mediterranean line and the Wider Middle East.47
The creation of a “Wider Middle East” seems to produce some 
confusion between the Gulf region, identified in the EU Commission web 
page, and between the planned “Wider Middle East”. There is also 
confusion as to what the EU identifies as the Middle East, which in turn is 
also referred to as the Near East. The EU, when referring to the Middle East 
Peace Process or the Near East, includes both Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Israel and the West Bank and Gaza strip. All of these actors are also 
included in the Euro-Med partnership. If there are plans for a wider Middle 
East, this “wider” Middle East does not take full account, at least for the 
45 The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the 
Arab World” and Felix Neugart and Giacomo Luciani, eds. “The EU and the GCC. A new Partnership”. 
46 Commission of the European Communities. “The EU’s Mediterranean & Middle East Policy”. Also The 
Strategic Partnership will focus on the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, including the countries of 
the GCC, Yemen, Iraq and Iran. In: Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East”, p. 12. 
47 The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 7.   
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present, of Syria, Egypt, Israel nor Jordan. To complicate matters further, 
the EU Commission web page states: “In addition, the EU maintains 
relations with Middle Eastern countries situated around the Persian/Arabian 
Gulf (Gulf region)”.48  
This “Wider Middle East” is an option for a new specific framework 
for the region, faced with the option of extending the Barcelona Process or 
using the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) framework to deal with the 
challenges of this region, the EU decided for the grouping together of the 
GCC, Iran, Iraq and Yemen. According to the EU, both frameworks were 
incapable of properly tackling the specific problems of Arab States in that 
region and only a new framework could help to build stability for this group 
of countries.49 Joining two regions in one framework might seem 
appropriate, however according to Antonio Marquina, it is crucial to 
properly define regions if one is to achieve security, since simply 
expanding one region to include the other can cause obstructions in 
achieving the EU’s objectives in one of them:  
In geo-strategic and geo-economic terms, an expansion of the 
traditional geographic area is in order, so as to include areas as 
complicated as the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and a good part of 
Central Asia. 
If such an expansion is taken into consideration, the forces which 
influence and define the Mediterranean area, from the Caucasus 
through to the Balkans or the Persian Gulf, can result decisively in 
obstructing the implementation of preventative measures for 
Mediterranean conflict or potential conflict. This experience has 
already been witnessed with the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli 
conflicts. For these reasons, the first step of a Mediterranean conflict 
prevention policy consists of developing a definition of 
‘Mediterranean’ that is functional and appropriate enough to initiate 
a conflict prevention process.50
48 Commission of the European Communities. “The EU’s Mediterranean & Middle East Policy”.  
49 The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 7.   
50 Antonio Marquina, “Conflicy Pervention in the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A 
European Point of View”, Perceptions, IV, No. 2 (1999). 
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The EU aims at creating areas of stability particularly around its 
borders, transforming potential areas of chaos into regions of security. This 
objective was made specific within the European Union Security Strategy 
which was approved in December 2003, especially in the case of the 
Mediterranean: “Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries 
… on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and 
co-operative relations”.51 In regards to this objective of creating an area of 
stability, Gulf discourse is consistent with Mediterranean discourse. As 
such, in the case of the Gulf and the Arab World in general, the EU’s 
discourse has identified a comprehensive series of threats emanating from 
these regions as we have seen, recognizing the implications that chaos in 
the Arab World can have for the EU. EU discourse recognizes this threat, 
but more than this, calls for a comprehensive approach in order to tackle the 
roots of instability and stop it from spilling into the EU:
The main objective of the EU in its relations with the Arab World is 
to promote prosperity, peace and stability, thereby not only 
contributing to the welfare and security of the region, but also to its 
own security. Problems of terrorism and WMD originating there 
have a direct impact in Europe. In this context, the solution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is essential. There will be little chance of 
dealing fully with other problems in the Middle East until this 
conflict is resolved; such a resolution is therefore a strategic priority 
for the EU. 
An essential element of this overriding objective should be to 
encourage, support and facilitate reform in the political, economic 
and social areas. The aim is to advance political pluralism and 
democracy, and to stimulate social and economic development. In 
order to be effective, such reforms have to come from within the 
societies. An approach needs to be developed that is based on the 
mutual interest of Arab countries and the EU.52
As we can see, EU discourse supports an approach which touches 
many areas, not just promoting democracy, but also tackling the Arab-
51 The Council of the European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, 
Brussels, The Council of the European Union, 2003, p.8. [Available Online] 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 
52  The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 6.   
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Israeli conflict, and increasing stability by promoting economic and social 
development throughout the Arab World.   
Therefore, EU discourse is aiming at the creation of geopolitical 
boundaries, meaning areas of stability, both in the Mediterranean and in the 
Gulf, in order to achieve security for itself.53 The EU seeks to tackle the 
various threats it identifies to its security within these two regions so that 
they do not spill over into European territory. These geopolitical boundaries 
are accompanied by transactional boundaries, as in the case of the 
Mediterranean and eventually of the Gulf, the EU seeks to facilitate trade 
between regions. It seeks to implement a set of regulatory structures in 
order to facilitate commerce. In the case of the Mediterranean for example, 
the EU hopes to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. This 
would guarantee the EU access to other markets on preferential terms, as 
well as encouraging others to access its common market. 
 
With this process we can see that the EU is identifying the 
boundaries of its security priorities, be it in Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf or even the entire Arab world. This does not mean 
that bilateralism between individual EU member states and the Gulf is 
abandoned; the very nature of the EU allows this to continue. Nonetheless, 
according to the EU there is a need to ensure a coherent approach, 
coordinating different policy instruments, which could imply coordination 
both at the national level as well as at the EU level,54 allowing for 
bilateralism to be strengthened in the context of relations between two 
regions. Also, the EU identifies regions with common security problems, 
problems that may also prove a threat to the EU: 
 
While different countries face different challenges, it is possible to 
identify a number of challenges common to the majority of the 
countries involved. There is general agreement on the nature and 
scope of these challenges, which have been extensively documented 
in reports emanating from the countries concerned. These 
challenges will not be overcome by maintaining the status quo; 
53  Regarding the different notions of boundaries relating to the EU see: Michael Smith, “The European Union 
and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, No. 1 
(1996), pp. 5-28. 
54 See: The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's Partnership with 
the Arab World”. And Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Strategic Partnership with the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East”, both these documents recognize de need for better coordination of EU 
instruments and mechanisms.  
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political, social and economic reform is required. Such reforms can 
succeed only if they are generated from within the affected 
societies; they cannot and should not be imposed from outside.55
Regarding the Gulf, the EU recognizes the need for a regional stability 
strategy,56 bringing forth the regional element in EU foreign policy. 
Perhaps there will be divergences within the EU member states as to which 
concrete measures to apply, but an agreement was reached between 
members on the need to tackle a specific region. The reason for this, 
according to EU discourse, has to do with two different aspects. On the one 
hand, securing itself from threats originating in the Arab World and on the 
other contributing to regional and international stability by creating a zone 
of peace and prosperity in this same region. Greater coordination can only 
help in strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but 
coherency and coordination are needed when dealing on a regional level. 
There is a need for unity and a coherent approach to region by the EU, but 
any future common EU policy must take into account not only European 
aspirations but it must also not compromise on how to deal with the serious 
challenges facing the Middle East.57 This of course has a series of 
implications for the EU and its members but also for international relations 
and the EU’s role. One can say that the EU, a victim of its own success, is 
called to play a role in both the regional and international level that has and 
continues to put it at odds with the United States, but gaining the support of 
the Arab World or Latin America for example.  
In the end, creating a Gulf region might be possible, but through this 
idea of “Wider Middle East” it would include the GCC, Yemen, Iran and 
eventually Iraq. Previously we have seen that the EU has put forward a 
policy agenda for a common zone of peace in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, representing a possible basis for a comprehensive regional 
strategy. However, the possibility of extending the Neighbourhood Policy 
all the way to Iran or even to the GCC countries seems to have been, for the 
moment, discarded. Creating this “Wider Middle East” could require a 
significant region building effort on the part of the EU, putting in place a 
55 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East”, p. 2.    
56 The Secretariat General of the Council of the European Union. “Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the 
Arab World”, p. 6.   
57 Éric Remacle, “L’Europe au Moyen-Orient: Puissance Civile ou Militaire?” in Bernard Adam (ed.), Europe 
Puissance Tranquille? Rôle et Identité sur la Scène Mondiale, Brussels, GRIP-Éditions Complexe, 2006, p. 183. 
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Gulf wide security system, as suggested by some.58 But for the moment it 
signals a long due recognition for the region from the EU, but most of all it 
seems to indicate a willingness on the part of the EU to continue expanding 
its global awareness, notably into this strategically vital region decades 
after Britain left the Gulf. As we can see, this wider Middle East seems 
different from what we traditionally associate with the Middle East. It 
seems not to focus on countries like Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt 
and the Palestinian Authority, which are already covered by the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, but addresses the EU’s wish to engage what lies 
“East of Jordan”. Such creative terminology is not new to the EU, which for 
example includes Iran when speaking of the Arab World. Despite these 
regional arrangements, links between the two regions exist as we have seen. 
In a 2004 report the EU identified in its policy agenda some of the elements 
which the two regions have in common.59 There was at the same time, 
however, a recognition that there were differences between the two and the 
need for different instruments for dealing with them would be needed.60 In 
this respect, it seems that for the time being the GCC, Iran, Iraq and Yemen 




The relationship between discourse and boundaries is indeed a 
natural one, since it reflects how we see the other and it defines who we are 
but also who the other is. In this relationship, security is an important 
element: when something or someone is considered a threat it immediately 
places a barrier between two actors. In the cases we have seen, both in the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf, EU discourse has identified a series of security 
threats to European stability and from where they originate, creating 
regional boundaries that represent these areas of insecurity. Furthermore, 
these boundaries do not inhibit interaction between the two sides but, on the 
contrary, they form the basis for interaction and for dialogue in order to 
tackle any security threat. In this sense “the region” forms the best platform 
58 Felix Neugart and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), “The EU and the GCC. A New Partnership”, Original Version of 
March 2002. In Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, Center for Applied Policy Research in cooperation with 
The Mediterranean Programme, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advance Studies, European Institute [Available 
online] http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2005/2005_GCC-EU.pdf   
59 Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East”, p. 14.  
60 Ibid., p. 5-7. 
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from which to engage a common threat or threats, involving all state actors 
and sometimes even non-state actors in the dialogue.61
Small steps have been taken in regards to the EU’s role in the Arab 
World, with some boundaries being created. The latter, however, remain 
rather unclear, such that questions of the role of Europe in the wider Middle 
East are still being asked. Although EU security discourse regarding the 
Mediterranean seems quite developed, there is still much to do as to the 
Gulf countries. This is, however, slowly changing; discourse in the Gulf 
region was mainly bilateral in nature, and only recently, in 2003-2004, has 
the EU begun considering a regional approach. Additionally, security seems 
at present to figure at the top of EU priorities for the region: terrorism and 
Iran’s nuclear program are examples of priorities of the EU. The current 
trend in discourse seems to treat the Gulf not as a separate unit, but part of a 
broader region, the “Wider Middle East”. More than just a change of 
designation, the “Wider Middle East” signifies a perception by the EU of 
common challenges in that area. Moreover, this wider Middle East will 
perhaps signal the beginning of a much-needed coherent strategy for the 
region that could become a new area of insecurity from the point of view of 
the EU.
However, developments in the region might make the EU reconsider 
certain aspects of its policy, in particular the need for two distinct regions 
and its level of engagement. Consequently, we may ask how the EU will 
react to further integration by the GCC countries. The evolution of future 
relations with the GCC will be very interesting to follow. While building a 
regional framework the EU will have to deal with a regional organization 
within the framework. Additionally, we can ask ourselves why does the EU 
believe that the “Arab World” requires two frameworks, the Mediterranean 
and the wider Middle East partnership? Discursive elements show the 
potential overlap in certain areas: terrorism or the question of proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction are examples of issues common to the two 
regions. With the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran, and the continuing 
instability in Iraq with its risks of “bleed-back”, there could be a change in 
perceptions realizing that the two regions can be linked, leading to a single 
framework from Morocco to Iran. For this to happen, the level of discourse 
must be equal throughout this region, and it is clear that in order to play a 
greater role in international relations the EU must have a stronger presence 
61 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. 
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in the Gulf region. At present, the Mediterranean is the object of a much 
stronger discourse, being considered in the context of a “Wider Europe” 
initiative; whereas with regards to the “East of Jordan” it is within the 
“Wider Middle East”. Despite the direct impact of security threats from this 
last region, there are apparently no plans to bring the Gulf into the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy. A final thought on this last question: could the 
development of two frameworks, as opposed to a single one for the entire 
Arab World, reflect the larger US presence in the Gulf, which affects any 
other “outside” attempt at region building? Strong US penetration in the 
Gulf will be a barrier to any EU regional framework, forcing the EU to 
adopt specific frameworks for the Mediterranean and the Gulf. This 
situation could indeed begin to explain why these two frameworks and the 
difference in the level of discourse as well. However, with the current 
situation not favouring the US in the Arab World in general, in part due to 
the failure in Iraq, the misperceptions surrounding the war on terrorism, not 
to mention strained relations with Iran, this could represent a chance for the 
EU to increase its participation in the region bringing it closer, discourse 
wise, to the Mediterranean region.
 
Discourse could also change with eventual Turkish membership, as 
then the EU’s borders will reach Gulf region. How will this modify 
European perceptions of not only the Gulf, but the entire Arab World?62
Turkish membership would bring in a new series of challenges, but 
furthermore, and this is not to be underestimated, a direct land link to the 
region. The inclusion of Turkey in the European Union would allow the 
latter a stronger presence in the Middle East and Gulf regions, but also 
provide linkage between the Euro-Mediterranean framework and any future 
“East of Jordan” framework.  
 All these uncertainties raise important questions for the future of the 
EU as an international actor and as an actor in the Gulf. We may ask what 
responsibilities is the EU willing to take on and how will its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy be defined. Finally, we have seen how EU 
discourse sees the Gulf but we have not seen how the Gulf sees the EU and 
its regional plans. The success or failure of EU initiatives based on the 
discourse we have identified above will depend, not only on the EU itself, 
but also on its partners in the region and their own discourse. It will depend 
62 Christian Koch and Felix Neugart, “Introduction”, in Christian Koch and Felix Neugart (eds.), A Window of 
Opportunity Europe, Gulf Security and the Aftermath of the Iraq War, Dubai, Gulf Research Center, 2005, p. 11 
and Felix Neugart and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), “The EU and the GCC. A new Partnership”. 
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on how the different actors are reacting to EU policy and to this creation of 
a wider Middle East and, furthermore, how they perceive any future EU 
regional plans in relation to their own interests. On the European side, will 
the EU continue with two frameworks for the “Arab World” or will it 
pursue one framework from the Mediterranean all the way to Iran? Both 
regions have discursive contact points that seem to favour an eventual 
merging, but further study should be done to determine the characteristics 
of these regions and their exact relationship with the EU, because this is a 
two-way process. Answering these questions is an important step to further 
understand the interrelation between boundaries and discourse, but it will 
also help to understand the role of the EU within the region and regional 
cooperation in general. 
